If current news reports are any guide, most Americans are concerned about conventional military operations in the Middle East, in Africa, and in other geographic areas where American interests are threatened. However, little attention is paid to potential nuclear clashes, whether regional (North Korea, Iran) or intercontinental (Russia, China). Despite this, war planners would do well to know how we would wage nuclear war, if the need ever arose.
US nuclear operations can be divided into three broad areas: weapons delivery systems, command and control, and post-attack reconstruction.
Long-range bombers (B1, B2, B52) are the traditional means of launching nuclear weapons. However, the number of aircraft available for such missions has decreased since the mid-1960s due to improvements in surface-to-air missiles from both the United States and Russia. Still, there are post-attack targets that are suitable for these aircraft.
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Land-based ICBMs (Minuteman III) overcome the limitations of long-range bombers; however, the locations of the missile silos are well known and specific.
Submarine-launched missiles (Trident II) overcome the limitations of bombers and land-based missiles because submarines operate in stealth mode, making them elusive, if not impossible, targets for an enemy.
These three weapon launch systems are collectively known as the Triad. Its objectives are detailed in what was once called the Single Integrated Operating Plan, SIOP for short. It became operational on July 1, 1961, and was intended to ensure that capabilities were carefully tailored to objectives and that there was no overlap between components of the Triad. In 2003, SIOP became part of OpPlan 8044, the general war plan. In 2012 it became OpPlan 8010-12, Strategic Deterrence and Forced Employment. Although SIOP is not technically a current term, most senior officers know exactly what it means.
The procedures for the command and control of nuclear weapons are detailed in detail, the most important of which is the two-man rule. Aboard bombers, in missile silos, and in missile submarines, two high-ranking people must authenticate launch orders that come from the National Military Command Center (NMCC). The two-man rule also applies to the president of the United States, who must obtain competence from the Secretary of Defense before ordering a nuclear strike.
If the authorization for a nuclear attack is valid, the NMCC will issue an Emergency Action Message (EAM) to all nuclear-capable commands. This EAM will also be broadcast by the Alternate National Military Command Center (ANMCC) and by the National Emergency Airborne Command Post (NEACP). The EAM will specify the targets, the weapons to be used, and the Permissive Action Link (PAL) codes to unlock the weapons’ firing devices.
When two senior NMCC officers simultaneously turn the keys to release an EAM, 100 million people will perish, 50 million on each side. But in the United States 250 million will remain and survive, albeit in desperate circumstances. In Russia about 90 million will survive. Other effects: infrastructure in ruins, power grids destroyed, radioactive fallout, critical shortages of food, water and medical supplies. Americans will have to depend on Canada and Mexico for massive aid shipments, although the wall we are now building along our southern border may be an impediment to much of this aid.
The United States and Russia will cease to be powers of the first order. For the entire next generation after a nuclear exchange, both countries will be in reconstruction mode, as will Hiroshima and Nagasaki in the years after World War II. In an atomic war there are no winners, only losers.